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OPTION VALUES AND
FLEXIBILITY PREFERENCE
Abstract: Preference for flexibility is a behavioral attitude displayed
by people that prefer reversible to irreversible actions, and that are
willing to pay a premium in order to maintain the possibility of
changing their decision. This paper provides a functional
characterization of preference for flexibility, based on the notion of
option value. The proposed theory is shown to be useful to explain
the success of marketing policies that guarantee reimbursement in
consumption goods and financial markets. Moreover, it is possible to
interpret some "puzzles" about observed economic behavior: for
example, choice of apparently inferior solutions when economic, or
political, choices involve high degrees of irreversibility.
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1. Introduction
When choosing about consumption or investment allocations,
people make decisions that often constrain their future welfare. Granted
that these choices are optimally taken given the individual's current
preferences and information, the ranking of alternative solutions may be
dramatically changed later, producing ex-post suboptimal allocations.
These changes may be due to modifications in the physical or
socioeconomic environment, or in individuals' tastes. The possibility of a
change in the preference ranking1 introduces uncertainty in the decision
making process: individuals must bear the risk of making a decision that
eventually could be wrong. They may decide to hedge this type of
uncertainty by taking reversible actions: the success of marketing policies
that guarantee reimbursement of a purchase if the customer just changes
his mind is a clear reflection of this attitude. Similarly, derivatives (or
options) are a tool that is increasingly used to entice potential investors
in financial markets. Investors that buy the option are able to sell (put
option), or to buy (call option) a certain asset at a specified price -within
a certain period (expiration time): i.e. they buy the possibility to reverse
the present investment decision2.
Unfortunately, many choices are irreversible, and there is
nothing that the individual can do to modify the selected allocation. As
we will see more clearly in the next section, when one or more
alternatives are irreversible, the decision process often produces
suboptimal solutions. In some cases inferior allocations may be selected;
in other situations the decision process may even get stuck, i.e. the
economic agent prefers not to move from her present position, even if it
would be profitable to do so.
                                                 
1 This paper is only concerned with exogenous changes in preferences: for models
dealing with endogenous changes (i.e. determined by the action selected) cfr. Besley and
Coate (1998).
2 It may be added that these policies can be profitable if in fact most choices are not
reversed. Many experimental studies seem to confirm that physical possession has the
effect of increasing the value that individuals assign to a good: an example is given by
observed differences between willingness to pay to get a good, and willingness to accept
for selling it. Even after controlling for strategic behavior, WTA turns out to be
substantially higher than WTP (cfr. Adamowicz et.al (1993), Kahneman et al. (1990),
Knetsch and Sinden (1984)).
4The flexibility preference motive described in this paper may
help to interpret such empirically observed patterns in decision making,
that, if analysed by means of received theory, may not be explained.
Also, it accounts for market success of reimbursement guarantees, or
financial derivatives. It will be shown that by relaxing the assumption of
neutrality toward mixtures of distributions, we can "rationalize" (i.e.
interpret, predict) those choices.
The paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we analyse the
decision framing when one or more alternatives object of the choice are
irreversible. In section 3 we propose a model for decision makers that
prefer flexible solutions. Sections 4 and 5 present a formal
characterization of the model, and section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Choice and irreversibility
In this section we describe the structuring of decisions when
one or more alternatives are characterized by irreversibility. Suppose first
that the decision maker has to choose between alternative A and
alternative B. If the choice is irreversible, the decision process can be
described by the following decision tree:
A
r
B
where the square symbol represents a choice node. After the individual
takes one of the two alternatives, the decision process ends. Suppose
instead that an action allowing reversibility is available. The decision tree
can be represented as follows:
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where C represents a choice that produces reversibility: for example, the
choice of shopping in a store where reimbursement policies are offered.
If alternatives A or B are directly selected, the decision process ends; if
C is selected, the final allocation (A or B) is, ex ante, an outcome of a
probabilistic distribution, stemming from a chance node (the round
symbol): whatever alternative should he choose now, there is some
chance that it will be reversed later.
In fact, the bundle C is, ex ante, a probability distribution: in
particular, it is a binomial distribution with A and B as possible
outcomes. Moreover, since A and B are distributions (that may or may
not be degenerate), C should be regarded as a mixture distribution, i.e. a
probability compound of A and B.
Given a preference ranking of A and B, the standard
microeconomic assumptions about the economic agents' rationality have
strong implications about the final choice: if A is strictly preferred to B,
then, for an expected utility maximizer, it will also be preferred to C, so
the first choice node is automatically solved. This is necessarily so also
for other models of choice that satisfy the so-called betweenness axiom
according to this assumption, a linear combination (mixture) of two
indifferent probability distributions is also indifferent. If instead
betweenness is not satisfied3:, individuals may display attraction or
aversion toward mixtures of distributions. In the first case it may happen
that C (which is a mixture of A and B) is preferred to A (and B,
necessarily); in the second instance, it may happen that C is less
preferred than B (and A, necessarily).
                                                 
3 As far as we know, the weakest (least restrictive) betweenness model is the Implicit
Expected Utility model proposed by Dekel (1986). The most popular model that relaxes
the assumption of betweenness is the Rank Dependent Expected Utility model, first
proposed by Quiggin (1982), with further developments by the same author and, among
others, Chew, Karni, Safra, Segal, Wakker (cfr. Quiggin, 1993). Other non-betweenness
models include Machina's Generalized EU model (1982) and Kahneman and Tversky's
Prospect Theory (1979).
6If a reversal option is not available, the decision maker knows
that once her choice has made, she cannot turn back. Suppose that A is
strictly preferred to B; also, suppose that the individual displays
preference toward mixtures, so much that C would be strictly preferred
to either of them. Unfortunately, C is available only as a non choice. In
this situation the decision process may get stuck: if for the decision
maker the equivalent variation4 for a change from C to A is higher than
the opportunity costs deriving from inaction, she will prefer not to
choose any alternative. It should be noticed that we are considering a
situation where the relevant information about the two distributions is
constant, so there is not any gain in waiting5. Here, it is the aversion to
commitment, or to the risk of making a wrong decision, that motivates
the desire of a flexible choice.
When such a behavior is analysed under the expected utility
framework, it must be considered irrational: according to that model, A
should be strictly preferred to both B and C, no compensation would be
necessary to move from the status quo to the new allocation, and
consideration of opportunity costs would urge to a fast decision.
However, this behavior is frequently observed in public choice, and it
can be interesting to give an interpretation rather than just marking it as
irrational.
Another apparently irrational situation may arise when A is an
irreversible choice, strictly preferred to B, which is reversible; and again
the mixture of the two, C, is strictly preferred to either distribution. For
example, suppose that a policy maker strictly prefers land development
A to a conservative project B, but is not willing to bear the risk of a
wrong (irreversible) decision. Now, C is feasible either in the status quo
(no choice), or when the reversible alternative is taken: therefore, it may
happen that the policy maker will actually choose B, keeping the option
of reversing the decision later. While the revealed preference is not
rational (A is strictly preferred to B, but B is chosen), the decision can
be explained if we think that C rather than B is the object of the choice.
Again, this result is ruled out if neutrality toward mixtures is assumed.
                                                 
4 I.e. the variation in individual's income that would lead to the same level of welfare as
choosing the bundle A.
5 A different approach to the theory of flexibility uses the notion of quasi-option value,
first introduced by Arrow and Fisher (1974) and Henry (1974). It focuses on the value
of information that reduces the variability of the payoff distribution.
73. A model for flexible choices
The very existence of the aforementioned markets for financial
derivatives suggests that preference for flexibility implies a willingness to
pay some price for it, as it was already pointed out by Strotz (1956). This
amount is referred to as the option value, that in the words of Mitchell
and Carson (1989) can be defined as "the amount that people will pay
for a contract which guarantees them the opportunity to purchase a
good for a specified price at a specified point in the future, and may be
thought of as a risk premium to compensate for uncertainty about future
taste, income or supply".
The research on option values had its first start with a paper by
Cicchetti and Freeman (Cicchetti-Freeman, 1971). Their decision model
was designed for situations where possible changes in the demand of
some specific goods did not depend on changes in the preference
functional. This allowed comparisons between the utility of the ex post
distribution (obtained if the option is exercised) with the utility of the ex
ante distribution (without the option): the theory predicts that the
investor buys the option if that utility differential is positive. In this
framework, option value and risk premium are exactly the same.
However, this model does not apply to situations where future
preferences are uncertain. In such a case, the utility stemming from the
ex post distribution (after exercising the option) cannot be evaluated
according to current preferences, as the Cicchetti-Freeman model does.
If the individual knows the probability distribution of his future
preference functional, he could use it to evaluate the utility of the ex
post distribution. If there is much ambiguity, or even hard uncertainty6,
about future preferences, though, any present evaluation of his future
preferences distribution would be very difficult or impossible.
However, the Cicchetti-Freeman model can hardly be seen as
the appropriate framework to analyze the individual's decision to buy an
option. When the individual evaluates his (present) willingness to pay for
the option, he presumably compares the present utility from the two
distributions that he faces before knowing if he will exercise the option
                                                 
6 Roughly, the term ambiguity refers to situations where vagueness of information
about the true probability distribution may induce the formation of different beliefs; the
term hard uncertainty refers to situations where lack of information prevents the
formation of beliefs about the probability distribution.
8or not. One is the degenerate distribution about the irreversible choice.
The other is the distribution containing the option that allows reversal of
the decision, which is a compound of the two alternatives. For example,
suppose that the individual now prefers alternative A to alternative B,
but thinks that a reversal of his preferences in the future is possible.
Presumably, he will evaluate both prospects: the first, is A; the second,
containing the option, will be a probability mixture of A, weighted by the
probability that the individual assigns to maintaining the present choice,
say a; and B, weighted by the complementary probability (1-a) that he
assigns to the action of exercising the option, reversing his decision. The
individual then evaluates the distribution A and the distribution [a,A;(1-
a),B] according to his present preference function. It is important to
emphasize that the decision model should take into account the
probability that the option will be actually used: for example, the option
value for a consumer who is almost certain to return his purchase is
presumably higher than that of another consumer who is almost certain
to keep it.
The problem can also be framed in game-theoretic terms, as a
two stage game7:
The problem can also be framed in game-theoretic terms, as
a two stage game8:
                                                 
7 I am grateful to Bernie Grofman for suggesting this framework to help the exposition.
8 I am grateful to Bernie Grofman for suggesting this framework to help the
exposition.
A
B
A
B
Choice round II
Choice round I
a
1-a
B Choice round II
9Here, picking A on round one does not foreclose B on round 2:
it is equivalent to choosing a distribution C with alternative payoffs A
and B, so in a sense it is a mixed strategy. If you pick B on round 1 you
certainly get B on round 2: it can be seen as choosing a pure strategy.
The model presented in this paper takes into account the
probabilistic nature of the option. It compares probability mixtures of
distributions, where the option value, and the decision to buy the option,
is dependent on the probability that the individual assigns to the exercise
of the option. The option value will be defined, analogously to the risk
premium in the theory of risk aversion, as the difference between the
expected value of the distribution without the option and the expected
value of the distribution containing the option. This notion will serve as
an indicator of flexibility. As we will explain in the course of the paper,
preference for flexibility is related to the attitude toward mixtures of
distributions. The Expected Utility model assumes neutrality toward
mixtures; other models allow for aversion or attraction toward mixtures.
4. A Characterization for Option Values
We discuss situations where the decision maker faces two
alternatives: one being riskier, and with higher returns, than the other.
We choose this setting because it is more general, involving both
attitudes toward risk and flexibility. When the relevant distributions have
the same degree of risk the framework of this model can be applied as
well, with straightforward modifications. For simplicity, the following
discussion will be in terms of an investment in a risky financial asset, but
it applies to other risky choices as well: for example, decisions about
development or preservation of some wilderness area, where the former
can be seen as a riskier strategy, and the latter a less risky, but also less
profitable, strategy.
Suppose that a decision maker is thinking about investing on an
asset that will give returns with distribution F(x+e), where x is some
level of base wealth (that may be random itself), and e is a mean
preserving spread (Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970)) type of risk, so that
E(x+e)=E(x). Also, suppose that when the investor buys the risky asset,
he can also buy an option, which allows him to sell the asset at some
10
predetermined price (the exercise price) before resolution of uncertainty
about e. A number of clauses might be specified to restrict the right of
exercising the option solely upon the realization of some specified
events. For example, a foreign investor may buy an option that allows
refund of the capital invested only if the rate of exchange should rise
above a specified level. Now, let a be the probability that the investor
assigns to the possibility of exercising the option, and (1-a) be the
probability that he assigns to the possibility of keeping the riskier asset:
then he can consider his portfolio as a mixture (1-a):a of the riskier and
safer distributions: (1-a)(x+e)Å(x-y(a)), where the latter term is the
exercise price. The expected value of this mixture distribution is lower
than the expected value of F(x+e): we define the difference as the option
value.
For x ³0;  E[e] = 0 ; aÎ [0,1];
let y(a) solve
(x+e) ~ (1-a)(x+e)Å(x-y(a))
Define
Y(a) º
[ ]w w a w w a w we e y aò òò+ + -- - × + ×dF dF dFx x x( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )1
as the option value at a of the distribution (x+e).
The path (1-a)(x+e)Å(x-y(a)) represents a sequence of
indifferent distributions characterized by decreasing risk as a increases
in the interval [0,1]. The difference between the expected value of (x+e)
and the expected value of (1-a)(x+e)Å(x-y(a)) is the option value at a,
i.e. the individual's reservation price for the possibility of exercising the
option with probability a.
For a risk averse individual it must be true that the option value
is increasing in a; as a ® 1 it converges to the absolute risk premium,
i.e. the amount that the individual would be willing to pay to get full
insurance for the risk.
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5. Preferences over Mixtures and Option Values
We show in this section that the assumption of neutrality
towards mixtures, contained in the Eut model and in Non Eut models
satisfying the axiom of betweenness, implies that the option value Y(a)
paid to maintain a probability a of changing decision, is exactly a
proportion a of the absolute risk premium p that would be paid to get
full insurance for the risk. More formally, we have the following
12
Theorem 1: Let V(×) be a preference functional linear on mixtures of distributions;
for aÎ[0,1], let y(a) be the amount that solves:
(1) ò V(w)dFx+e(w) = ò V(w)dFx-p(w) = ò V(w)d[(1-a) Fx+e + aFx-
y(a)](w)
Then
Y(a) = a×p.
Proof: Let V(×) be a preference functional linear on mixtures of
distributions; and let p be the absolute risk premium that solves
ò V(w)dFx+e(w) = ò V(w)dFx-p(w).
Since the functional is neutral towards mixtures, we have also:
(2) ò V(w)dFx+e(w) = ò V(w)d[(1-a) Fx+e + aFx-p)](w) = ò V(w)dFx-
p(w).
where the middle term is the utility of the mixture of the other two.
Therefore in this case
ò V(w)d[(1-a) Fx+e + aFx-y(a)](w) = ò V(w)d[(1-a) Fx+e + aFx-p](w)
i.e. when preferences display neutrality toward mixtures of
distributions, y(a) is equal to p.
The option value for this type of functional is therefore given by
the following expression:
Y(a) = ò w dFx+e(w) - ò w d[(1-a) Fx+e + aFx-p](w)
which is the difference between the expected value of the risky asset,
and the expected value of the asset with option. From the above
equation we have:
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Y(a) = a× ò w dFx+e(w) - ò w dFx-p(w).
and since the expected value of the distribution Fx+e  is E(x), we obtain:
Y(a) = a×p.
Corollary 1: If the preference functional is linear on mixtures of distributions, the
term y(a) is equal to p for all a.
Proof: Obvious.
Corollary 2: If the preference functional is concave (i.e. the contour curves are convex)
on mixture of distributions, the option value Y(a) ³ a×p. If the preference
functional is convex (i.e. the contour curves are concave) on mixture of distributions,
the option value Y(a) £ a×p.
Proof: Substitute £ (resp. ³ ) to the sign = before the mixture in (2).
The amount Y(a) can be considered as an indicator of
preference for flexibility: if Y(a) is greater than a×p, then the individual
displays preference for flexibility. If the two distributions are
characterized by the same degree of risk, so that the risk premium is
null, the option value associated to any mixture of the two is to be
attributed entirely to the preference for flexibility motive.
The results of this section indicate that an individual with a
strong preference for flexibility is also willing to pay a higher price for it
than individuals characterized by other types of preferences, in
accordance to the aforementioned definitions given by Strotz and
Mitchell and Carson.
6. Conclusions
In section 2 we considered a couple of examples where at least
one of the alternatives is irreversible. In these situations we have seen
that actual choices may differ from stated preferences, because of a
preference for flexible solutions. Preference for flexibility can be
modeled as a preference for mixtures of distributions: an individual
characterized by this type of preferences would require a premium
(option value) to move from a mixture distribution to a "pure"
distribution. A reversible alternative, or the status quo may be
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considered as mixture distributions: in both cases either alternative is
still available.
Of course, each choice is associated to some opportunity costs.
Suppose that the opportunity costs associated to the mixture distribution
are higher than those that should be borne if the alternative is chosen. If
the option value for the mixture distribution is higher than the
opportunity costs, the decision maker will anyway reasonably choose the
mixture distribution: i.e. the reversible alternative, or, if not available, the
status quo.
However this result holds only if the standard assumptions
about decision making under uncertainty are relaxed.9 If EUT or other
models that assume betweenness (i.e. preferences are linear over
mixtures of distributions) are used to model the decision process, no
option value would arise, and the choice described above must be
considered irrational.
We have seen in the course of this paper that taking into
account the preference for flexibility motive may help to give a rationale
to these choices, and interpret, or predict, the outcome. Of course, even
if these choices are given a rationale, they still remain suboptimal. If we
consider public choices, this attitude can be considered as a serious
cause of political failure: policy makers may feel inclined to hedge
uncertainty about their own, or their electors', change of preferences by
choosing reversible actions- or, sometimes, not choosing at all, clinging
to the status quo10, even if it would be more profitable to take different
actions. An example is the incapacity of many regional governments in
European Union to spend their investment allowances. A correction
mechanism would be useful.
Many researchers in public choice and political science stress the
importance of direct participation of people to public decision. Bohnet
                                                 
9 Similar results are obtained, under more stringent behavioral assumptions, by Benartzi
and Thaler (1995) in their research on the equity premium puzzle observed in financial
markets: they assume myopic loss aversion, which is a behavioral hypothesis supported
by a particular model implying preference for mixtures of distributions.
10 Another important form of risk hedging is prudence (see Kimball, 1990, 1993): a
typical example is precautionary savings, that in our context may be represented by a
decision of developing part of the land, and preserving the remaining part. This strategy
is not always feasible.
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and Frey (1994) find experimental and empirical evidence (for
Switzerland) of the importance of direct democracy instruments for
stable and successful policies. Doeleman (1997) suggests use of
referenda11 to correct possible distortions in the political agenda setting.
In the light of the results of our work, we can add that by transferring
part of the responsibility from the policy maker to the voters, these
instruments can help to quicken the decision process when the
irreversible nature of the choices involved seems to hamper it. Indeed, in
California the use of referenda as a device to decide on the provision of
local public goods has increased so much that some researchers (cfr.
Schrag (1996)) talk of "referendum madness". Opinion polls, contingent
valuation analyses, and other forms of sample surveys may represent, in
many cases, a valid and more convenient alternative to general referenda.
                                                 
11 Doeleman argues that politicians are generally opposed to referenda, since they can
be considered as means of sanction to the politician actions. While this is certainly true
for abrogative referenda, the argument does not hold for propositive referenda, here
interpreted as a hedge that politicians may use against the risk of wrong irreversible
choices.
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